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A m u l t i n a t i o n a l  s e e k i n g  i n  v a i n  a  u n i o n  as a counterpait in bargaining; another 
multinational expelling union representátivés from the finn; companies with good and 
bad labour relations; small and medium-size firms with no unions at all— all these 
may be found in news items, case-studies and episodes from the near pást of labour 
relations in transformation and development in the post-socialist countries. After five 
to six years of the political, social and economic transformation can we already speak 
about a new system in the field of labour relations, or is it still in transformation? Is 
the experience of this half-decade sufficient to identify the features of the new 
emerging system with any of the already known pattems of labour relations?
In the laté 1980s and early 1990s in Central and Eastem Europe there were 
widespread illusions as to the prospects of labour relations and the new role of 
employees and their interest associations. The intemational, economic and social 
conditions of the reál processes of social transformation in these countries, however, 
framed events differently, and the new institutions of labour relations and social 
cooperation seem to display unexpected pattems. Social scientists and politicians as 
well as unionists are now seeking to understand the reál logic of the transformation 
process and the motives and intentions of the social partners within it. Since the social 
and economic context of the current transformation process varies from country to 
country in Eastem and East-Central Europe, very different strategies and practices of 
institution building, combined with national and local traditions of interest represen- 
tation and participation, are creating a rich variety of new autonomous systems of 
labour relations. Several elements of the political and economic transformation are 
closely connected to the shaping of the labour relations system in the post-socialist 
countries. Somé of them are supporting its development, while others are unfavour- 
able to its strengthening. Certain factors are unique in the different Central and East 
European countries, others represent intemational trends. This article aims to illustrate 
the characteristics of institution building in the field of labour relations in Hungary.
In Hungary the new democratic political order, its laws and institutions, has finally 
ensured the existence of an autonomous labour relations system after a long period of 
reforms since the laté 1960s aiming at loosening the subordination of labour relations 
to a monolithic political order. The political transformation was carried out by social 
actors and organisations that— even if newly created in democratic processes— were
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related to the practice of the farmer, gradually reformed system. Experience, tradi- 
tions, social relations and networks accumulated from the 1970s onward can be found 
behind the peaceful character of the political and economic transformation in 
Hungary, and the same factors can explain the continuity of certain practices in the 
íield of interest representation and bargaining as well as the survival of mistrust by 
different social and political actors towards the institutions of the labour relations 
system.
Actors and institutions o f  labour relations in Hungary
The actors and institutions of labour relations were created in the very complex 
process of transformation to a markét economy, to plurálist parliamentary democracy, 
and to privatisation of public property through intensive legislation since 1988 in 
Hungary (Transformation of Public Enterprises— 1988, Strike Law— 1989, Employ- 
ment Law— 1991, new Labour Code— 1992, Bankruptcy Law— 1992, Law on 
Privatisation— 1992, Social Act— 1993). CiovO
The laws on the transformation of former state-owned enterprises intő limited 
liability or joint-stock companies, as well as the law on privatisation, created 
employers as an independent social and economic actor (le patronat). As the 
economic transformation and privatisation is a rather complex process consisting of 
the transformation of state-owned enterprises and the creation of priváté enterprises 
through investment by foreign companies as well as the emerging national bour- 
geoisie, the employers do nőt form a homogeneous group. Their stratification and the 
interrelations of their representative organisations in tűm exert their influence on 
Hungárián labour relations.
As to the other social partner, the new labour legislation protects the right of free 
employee association and the right of trade unions. The new political system and 
labour legislation transformed the unified monolithic structure of unionism intő a 
plurálist one. In Hungary new independent unions were formed since 1987-88, l 
mostly in the academic community, bút in a few larger enterprises as well. These new 
unions at the beginning took a strong political role, opposing the still existing 
party-state and the monopoly of the former unions. These latter, however, were 
already starting their transformation intő federalist, more democratic structures and 
had broken their dependence on the Communist Party.
The other laws on employment, on strikes and the Labour Code set up the rules of 
negotiations and the solutions of labour conflicts. On the one hand, the new legislation 
is favourable fór the employees as it guarantees unión rights and representation and 
institutionalises collective action. On the other hand, employment is nőt protected any 
longer. Rationalisation and restructuring of firms, together with privatisation, are 
considered more important political and economic targets that are nőt compatible with 
the political commitment to full employment, with the former constitutionally 
guaranteed right to work. Labour lawyers critical of new legislation called attention 
to the fact that ‘social and economic issues have been included in the constitution in 
a much less considered and elaborate way than the political ones...labour issues were i 
considered as side issues by the leading political forces of transition’ (Kollonay &[ 
Ladó, 1992, p. 23).
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The liberal ideology of economic deregulation and social transformation, the moves ( 
towards a free markét economy and the new emerging priváté employers are often > 
opposed to the strong influence of the trade unions. At the same time, however, the 
new political system needed social institutions to legitimate the transformation, fór the 
stabilisation of society, fór the control of social conflicts and to negotiate about the 
social costs of the fundamental changes. (In 1990, when the Hungárián capital was 
paralysed by a blockage of taxi and truck drivers protesting against the radical rise of 
fuel prices, the conflict was negotiated and settled within the National Council fór the 
Reconciliation of Interests (NCRI) established already in 1988. This was the first time 
after the political tűm that an institution of labour relations demonstrated its social 
and political utility fór the new political forces through its capacity to deliver a 
nationwide agreement.)
Actors and strategies
The new social partners and their strategies have been undergoing significant changes 
since the beginning of the transformation.
The state remained the most important actor in the field of labour relations by its 
role as employer and by its political role. By this latter role the state is responsible
• fór labour legislation and fór supervision of its implementation,
• fór the creation and maintenance of employment services,
• fór participation in trinartite negotiations with the trade unión confederations and 
employers associations. This tripartite body, already created before the political 
transformation, aimed at developing social dialogue and sharing the responsibility 
fór decisions in the worsening economic conditions of the 1980s. The tripartite 
national-level negotiations in the NCRI later helped to work out and stabilisé the 
basic rules, principles and standard regulations of Hungárián labour relations.
The state, through its intervention in economic processes like investment, privatisa- 
tion and monetary policy, has a decisive influence on the labour markét, on 
employment and working conditions. Since 1993 in Hungary wage policy has nőt 
been centralised and wages are open to agreement between employees and employers. 
Only minimum wages are settled by joint agreements in the National Council fór 
Reconciliation of Interests. However, the state has no means to ensure that these 
agreements are respected.
As employer the state owns a gradually diminishing number of firms in the 
economy, so the number of employees in public firms is decreasing. More than half 
of employment is already in the priváté sector. (Estimádon of such sectoral distri- 
bution of employment is rather difficult owing to the large proportion of mixed 
property.) The state still is the largest employer and its role is especially important in 
the largest industrial firms, in public administration, transport, fináncé, education, 
health and other social services.
In the branches where the state is the main or only employer the trade unions are 
traditionally strongest. Consequently, in these fields the state as employer is under 
strong unión pressure. In Hungary, where strike activity remained rather low com- 
pared with the other Central East European countries, the most important strikes were
TABLE 1
S t r jk e s  in  H u n g a r y  a n d  P o l a n d
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Number o f  strikes Number o f  participants 
(in thousands)
1991 1992 1993 1991 1992 1993
Hungary
Poland
3
305
10
6 362
17 
7 362
250 25-30 20 
221 730 382
Source: ‘Ha már elhallgat a csend’. Heti Világgazdaság, 24 February 1994.
organised in the state-owned branches like rail transport, the energy sector and 
education (Table 1). (Evén in the police and the military the govemment as employer 
has been threatened by the respective trade unions with waming strikes.)
The representation of employegs within the system of labour relations is undergo- 
ing significant changes.Tts polarised characlcr. has become Consolidated, although 
immediately after the political tűm the trade union movement had a fragmented 
character, a great number of smaller and larger new unions and federations were 
formed, and their relations were rather conflictual. At national level the main aims of 
rivalries were fór political influence and redistribution of the former unions’ huge 
assets. A slow crystallisation and concentration of the trade union movement reduced 
the number of union confederations to the following six by 1993:
• MSZOSZ (National Association of Hungárián Trade Unions), the successor to the 
former unified trade union, which in its present form of organisation as a federation 
of branch unions has existed since 1988.
• ASZOK (Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions), the successor to a few 
influential former branch unions like those in the chemical, pharmaceutical and a 
part of the railway sectors.
• LIGA (Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions), the first genuinely 
independent union confederation bőm as part of the political opposition to the 
party-state at the end of the 1980s.
• MOSZ (National Alliance of Workers Councils), another new and independent 
trade union centre, created in certain industrial plants by skilled and militant 
workers with a strong nostalgia fór the self-goveming bodies of industrial organi- 
sations.
• SZÉF (Cooperation Fórum of Trade Unions), the most influential branch organis­
ation in public administration and in the service sector.
• ÉSZT (Intellectual Workers Trade Union Association), a relatively small union 
centre comprising somé organisations in education and research.
In the new conditions almost all union centres were facing internál and external 
legitimacy problems at the beginning of the 1990s. The almost 100% membership of 
employees in unions in the period after World War II has diminished to ca. 30% in 
most of the Central East European countries. This rate can still be considered high in 
comparison with the most developed industrial (OECD) countries. In Hungary the 
average membership of all the union centres seems to be stabilised around one-third
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of the active wage-eamers. This radical decrease in unión density rate can be 
explained by several factors:
• Employment has been reduced dramatically; more than one-third of the jobs 
existing in the laté 1980s were destroyed in the few years of the ‘transformation 
crisis’. Inactivity and unemployment are radically reducing the possible social 
space fór traditional unión activities.
• The manufacturing sectors as core fields fór unión activities are losing importance 
in employment.
• The decentralisation of the organisational structure of the economy has alsó had an 
impact on the sphere open to unions. The proportion of micro organisations and 
family enterprises without unions has increased substantially in a very few years. 
In the 1980s only 4-5%  of active wage eamers worked in individual or family 
business organisations. In 1993 this had increased to 21% (Laky, 1994, p. 74).
• The increased political and ideological rivalry at the beginning of the 1990s among 
the trade unión confederations disillusioned and alienated employees. On the firm 
level one-time and possible members of the unions were less interested in this 
rivalry and often missed the appropriate unión support in the everyday problems 
related to privatisation, restructuring and the reduction of employment.
• The deep cuts in the social infrastructure of firms, run by the unions, diminished 
the advantages of unión membership.
• The spread of new managerial techniques and the implementation of the ‘leading 
edge’ practice of Humán Resource Management (especially at the multinational 
companies) opened direct dialogue—without unión presence—between employers 
and rank-and-file people. Individual working contracts have alsó weakened the 
influence of unions on interest representation.
The successor unión centres— mainly MSZOSZ— were under strong political pressure 
nőt only from the newly emerging autonomous unions bút alsó from the new political 
and govemment forces. Their credibility as autonomous new organisations to rep- 
resent employee interests was questioned at different political forums—even by 
parliamentary forces—because of their former subordinated role to the communist 
party. This political rivalry on the national level, seeking political legitimacy, often 
distracted the forces of the federation from employment-related issues. MSZOSZ lost 
a considerable part of its membership owing to the pluralisation and transformation 
of labour relations, bút it continued to have the largest number of members.
The new autonomous trade unions bőm in the political battles of the laté 1980s 
faced a different type of legitimacy deficiency. They had no organisational roots in 
the world of work, which was reflected in the low level of membership. This has 
placed a questionmark against their representativeness vis-á-vis govemment during 
national-level consultations. After the establishment of the new political institutions 
of plurálist political democracy, these unions were forced to leam the ‘profession of 
unionism’ and to leave the political aréna to the new parties. (Many activists have left 
the new unions and become important figures in the new political parties.)
After the political transformation, the representativeness of the trade unions was 
tested several times. These tests were decisive even fór the redistribution of trade 
unión assets (i.e. reál estate, companies, publishing houses, schools, resorts
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and sports centres). As the unión confederations could nőt settle the conflict about 
distribution of unión assets among themselves, the govemment took the initiative. 
Union members were required to renew their membership in 1992 if they wished it 
to continue. The result of this test did nőt modify the membership distribution and 
MSZOSZ maintained its majority.
The second test was organised together with the elections fór self-goveming bodies 
of the Health and Pension Insurance schemes. In Hungary these two big social 
security funds have been run by tripartite bodies since 1993. Employees are repre- 
sented by delegates of the unions in the six unión centres. Their first election was 
organised together with the first Works Council elections. The results of these 
elections were expected to be the guidelines fór the provisional redistribution of unión 
assets (fór the detailed result see the Appendix). MSZOSZ reinforced its political and 
organisational legitimacy during these elections. It obtained 72% in the Works 
Council elections, 50% of the seats on the employees’ side of the Pension Insurance 
Body and 45% of the employees’ side in the Health Insurance Body. In 1995 the 
second Works Council elections only slightly modified the above proportions, which 
remained the definitive ratio fór redistributing the former unión assets.
The successful transformation of the former unions could be explained by several 
factors:
• they maintained their administrative and economy-wide organisational network,
• they had more tradition, practice and skill in the field of negotiation on the national 
as well as on the firm level,
• the new trade unions from the beginning have adopted a more conflictual strategy 
to fight the economic power of management of the former state-owned companies 
and later in the privatised firms, while the former unions, following their traditions, 
were more cooperative with management, putting more emphasis on the survival of 
the firm,
• the conflictual strategy of the new unions did nőt fit with the privatisation intentions 
of the new political forces (which nőt so long before were founded and supported 
by the same new autonomous unions).
After the stabilisation of membership rates and the results of the repeated tests of 
legitimacy, the settlement of the redistribution of trade unión assets seemingly cooled 
down the rivalry. The tendency to fragmentation has stopped and a new period of 
concentrating unión efforts seems to have opened. This is expressed by increased 
coordination between different unión centres at national-level tripartite negotiations, 
and there are intentions of unification on the part of the smaller unión centres. Two 
influential centres, MSZOSZ and SZÉF, have concluded a strategic alliance to 
coordinate their actions.
The employers as social partners are composed of very different groups, different 
in their social background, in economic weight, in their political influence and in their 
labour relations strategies. One important group of employers is formed by the 
managers of the remaining state-owned firms. The new entrepreneurs might be 
Hungarians or foreigners, buyers of once state-owned firms or smaller units, or even 
owners of newly established companies. They formed organisations according to 
the dimensions of their firms or according to the origin of their Capital. Small
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entrepreneurs and artisans have set up their own traditional associations. Multinational 
firms constitute another small bút rather influential group of employers.
In the National Council fór the Reconciliation of Interests, the employers’ side is 
constituted by nine organisations:
• MGYOSZ (Manufacturers National Association), which concentrates Hungárián 
proprietors of larger firms and somé of the foreign-owned firms,
• MMSZ (Association of Hungárián Employers), which is the organisation of 
employers of public and mixed firms,
• VOSZ (National Association of Entrepreneurs) is the association of small and 
medium-size firms,
• Hungárián Industrialists’ Federation,
• IPOSZ (Industrial Craftsmen Association), both representing artisans,
• Agrarian Employers Association,
• MOSZ (National Federation of Agricultural Producers and Cooperatives),
• AFEOSZ (National Federation of General Consumers Cooperatives),
• KISOSZ (National Federation of Retail Traders).
The multinationals have formed their own pressure group, a special association. It is 
nőt a participating member at the National Council fór Interest Reconciliation bút 
regularly meets key ministers and decision makers of the govemment.
Among the social partners the employers form the most heterogeneous side. Their 
interests, as well as their political influence, differ considerably according to the 
sector and dimensions of their firms. The unfinished privatisation is still keeping the 
employers’ side in a fluid state. Their fragmented associations have fewer roots and 
traditions than the unión side has. Lacking coordination and similar or joint interests, 
they were regarded as the weakest social partners at the tripartite negotiations. Only 
recently were intentions of more coordination among them identified. The two largest 
associations, MGYOSZ and MMSZ, have agreed to cooperate more closely fór more 
efficient representation of employers’ interests at national-level negotiations.
As to the strategies of the different employer groups in the field of labour relations, 
they are far from being homogeneous. The proprietors of small and medium-size 
enterprises are rather conservative and anti-unionist. They oppose the intervention of 
the state in employment relations. In many of the small and medium-size firms even 
minimum wage levels fixed at the national tripartite negotiations are nőt implemented. 
A great part of ‘black labour’, without legal regulations and guarantees, is employed 
in this sphere.
Employers and managers in the large plants already have the tradition of dialogue 
with the trade unions and of direct negotiations with the employees. In these firms 
(privatised completely or partially or still in state ownership) management is inter- 
ested in maintaining consensus and cooperation with the unions. In certain cases in 
the remaining state-owned organisations management and unions have a common 
interest in obtaining more subventions, credits and investment from the govemment. 
(Fór example, the rather strong and annual strike activity at the National Railway 
Company— organised jointly by three different unions of the branch—represents 
pressure on the govemment to fináncé wage increases and technological develop- 
ment.)
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Multinational companies, which might have come to Hungary by buying com- 
pletely or partially state-owned firms or by ‘green-field’ investments, follow their own 
model of labour relations. This might be in certain cases anti-unionist, in others 
favourable to ‘micro-corporatist structures’ of firm-level communication and nego- 
tiation without the branch unions. The practice of labour relations in the Hungárián 
plants of these multinational companies is regarded as an intemational challenge by 
unions. The branch unión in the chemical sector, fór example, has already initiated 
intemational cooperation with the unions of the home countries of the different 
multinationals to establish common standards fór collective bargaining with the 
intemational management (on the different approach of multinational companies to 
labour relations see the Appendix).
Legal regulations and institutions
The most important source of labour legislation is the new Labour Code adopted by 
the freely elected Parliament in 1992. It completed the cumulative changes in the 
system of labour relations and set down the legal framework fór its key institutions:
•  It legitimates the national-level institutions of interest conciliation (the NCRI, 
established in 1988).
• It lays down the rights and conditions of unión activities in firms.
• It defines the representativeness of the unions within the circumstances of the 
pluralistic unión movement.
• It regulates the conditions of collective bargaining and labour disputes.
• It establishes the institutions of Works Councils as a tool of employee participation 
and describes the conditions of their creation and their functions.
In this section we shall focus attention on collective bargaining and Works Councils 
as key institutions of Hungárián labour relations.
Although collective agreements existed both on branch and firm level even before, 
collective bargaining had very limited meaning owing to the lack of autonomy and 
independence of the partners. The party-state regulated what should be settled in the 
collective agreements and the lack of autonomous partners made the bargaining 
process fictitious.
To analyse the specific features of collective bargaining in Hungary we distinguish 
two different types, both of which are playing an important role to reach a degree of 
consensus and somé form of more or less conflictual cooperation. The traditional and 
well known decision-making process created and maintained by the social partners of 
industrial relations in the field of employment-related issues (i.e. wages, working 
conditions, etc.) can be considered as the first type of collective bargaining. The 
second type is providing an institutional tool to build consensus on the principal 
orientations of the social and economic policy of the country. In Hungárián practice 
the National Council fór the Reconciliation of Interests as a tripartite body illustrates 
well this extended type of collective bargaining.
The new Labour Code has created a legal framework within which free bargaining 
can be possible between employers and employees. Fundamental changes characterise 
the content and the partners of collective bargaining. As to the content, the Labour
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Code sets a statutory minimum of employment conditions— collective agreements 
could provide more favourable conditions. The Labour Code recognises the trade 
unions’ right to sign collective agreements at national, branch and firm levels. At one 
employer one collective agreement can be concluded. If there is only one union at a 
given employer to sign this agreement on the employees’ side it should get more 
than 50% of the votes during Works Council elections. According to the Labour 
Code, a collective agreement might be signed by several unions at the same firm, 
presupposing that they have a common platform and obtained together more than 50% 
of the votes during Works Council elections. Unions having less than 10% at Works 
Council elections are nőt considered to be ‘representative’ negotiating partners. 
Employers at firm level should annually pút a draft collective agreement to the local 
one or more representative unions and this draft should include at least provisions on 
wages.
The role and influence of collective agreements are somewhat difficult to evaluate, 
fór several reasons. First, in the current unfavourable economic situation— after a 
deep recession since 1989 and amidst the high foreign and internál debts of the 
govemment—the partners have limited scope fór action. Second, neither the employ­
ers nor the unions have accumulated the necessary experience fór on-going bargain- 
ing. Third, successful bargaining would require the identification of the partners, 
which has nőt yet been completed among employers on the national and branch 
levels, mostly because the process of privatisation is nőt yet finished.
Managerial interests in agreements and in their contents might differ before and 
after privatisation and even according to the possible perspectives of privatisation— 
whether the firm is to be sold in different parts or as a whole, who are the expected 
new proprietors, whether management and/or employees might have a share in 
ownership of the future company, etc. These are all open questions that might 
influence most of the issues on the agenda during collective bargaining bút may be 
beyond the influence of the bargaining parties.
Other important dimensions are the levels and coverage rate of collective bargain­
ing. According to intemational experience (or at least the existing pattems of the 
OECD countries) the coverage rate of collective agreements concluded is generally 
higher than the average union density rate (Traxler, 1994). As we have no statistics 
on the number of employees covered by accepted collective agreements we rely on 
estimates. In Hungary the norms and procedúrái dimensions fór branch and firm-level 
bargaining are set at national level in the Council fór the Reconciliation of Interests. 
This tripartite organ conducts the extended type of national level collective bargaining 
in which the social partners are consulted on macroeconomic strategies, social policy 
packages, taxation or the annual budget. The consultations are carried out at plenary 
sessions among representatives of the three social partners. The Council has special 
subcommittees to negotiate on different issues of employment, social policy, bud- 
getary issues etc. The members of the unions’ and employers’ sides alsó have separate 
sessions to prepare their stand fór the plenary sessions. The Council itself has a small 
administration fór organising the consultations and communication between the social 
partners.
Evaluating the forms and levels of collective bargaining, we could say that 
economy-wide, branch (or meso) and firm-level collective bargaining are simul-
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taneously present in Hungárián labour relations practice (see Appendix Table A.6). 
Therefore it is impossible to use a generál coverage rate. According to the summary 
of the Phare Fact-Finding Committee the following coverage rates could reflect the 
influence of collective negotiations (Ladó & Tóth, 1995):
• Economy-wide agreements set the level of minimum wages in Hungary fór the 
whole community of wage eamers. (Since the establishment of the National 
Council fór the Reconciliation of Interests minimum wages were increased consid- 
erably, even if they could nőt keep up with rising prices and costs of living; see 
the Appendix.) Evaluating the performance of the plenary sessions of NCRI, these 
macro-level consultations might be said to have been dominated by issues concem- 
ing socio-economic policy: more than 50% of the items discussed belonged in this 
category. Questions of wages, working and employment conditions represented 
only 20% of the items, while vocational training policy accounted fór 10% of the 
items discussed at plenary meetings.
•  Sectoral bargaining— or meso-level negotiations—were estimated to cover only 
11% of employees, in 12 agreements.
• Firm/establishment level— or single-employer—bargaining is considered to be by 
far the dominant tendency in Hungary; 30-35% of the firms are covered by this 
level of collective bargaining in the competitive branches of the economy. This 
means that the number of employees covered by collective bargaining may be even 
higher.
Apart from the levels and coverage of collective bargaining it is worth noting the 
changes in the topics of labour disputes between employers and employees at firm 
level. Nowadays, besides the still important question of wages, we find privatisation, 
reorganisation of the firms and, connected to these issues, the problem of employment 
protection. Circumstances and procedures of redundancy have alsó moved intő the 
centre of labour disputes (Table 2).
Conceming the atmosphere of collective bargaining, the current feature of labour 
relations in Hungary is the cooperative approach between unions and management. To
TABLE 2
C h a n g in g  T o p ic s  o f  L a b o u r  D ispu t es
Subjects Before 1990 1990 and after
Reorganisation o f the company 96 117
Implementation o f privatisation 30 114
Introduction o f workers’ ownership 24 109
Safety in the workplace 85 175
W age issues 245 213
Other allowances 196 158
Work schedule and shift work 84 54
Work time (overtime) 84 64
Redundancy payments 39 122
Source: Makó & Novoszáth (1995, p. 261).
Labour relations officials were interviewed in a national sample o f 345 firms. The 
numbers express how often the above issues were mentioned as topics of disputes 
in these firms.
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strengthen the cooperative pattems among the social partners a new institution of 
labour relations was set up in the summer of 1996; the National Service fór 
Reconciliation and Arbitration was founded to settle labour disputes in their very 
early phase and at their site of origin.
This cooperative approach was nőt questioned even in cases of major cuts in the 
workforce and massive lay-offs. According to a survey by the Japanese Institute of 
Labour carried out in a large sample of Hungárián firms the majority of firm-level 
unions (99) have accepted and a significant number (64) have even supported 
cutbacks in employment. Only 20 local unions have declared their rejection of 
lay-offs at their plants (JIL, 1992). No differences were found in this approach 
backing the reduction of employment between unions belonging to the different 
centres and confederations.
Another new key institution of Hungárián labour relations is the Works Councils. 
This represents a radical break with the pást, when trade unions’ functions of 
representing employee interests and employee participation in managerial decisions 
were confused. The new Labour Code separates the main function of the unions, that 
is interest representation, participation in collective bargaining and organisation of 
collective action, from the participation of employees. ‘Participatory rights are 
exercised in the employees’ name by the Works Council or work delegates elected by 
them’ (Labour Code, 1992, eh. IV, Para. 42).
Works Councils have to be elected at every work piacé where the number 
of employees is above 50 by secret ballot from among the candidates nominated 
by unions or other groups of employees. (In smaller organisations, bút with 
more than 15 employees, work delegates should be elected.) The Works Councils 
(and delegates) are elected fór a three-year period and are aimed at developing 
social norms and rules fór long-term conflict solution. They have three types 
of rights:
(1) To give and refuse consent to the allocation of the social welfare funds and the 
utilisation of social facilities and reál estate of their firms specified in the 
collective agreements. Beside this type of joint decisions an agreement has to be 
reached between management and the Works Council on labour health and safety 
regulations too.
(2) To be informed of and asked to comment on a broad rangé of issues (i.e. drafts 
of measures that have an impact on a large segment of employees, like the 
reorganisation of the firm, privatisation, mergers, vocational training, career 
development, etc.).
(3) The employer has the obligation to inform the Works Councils at least every six 
months about the principal factors affecting business, trends in employment and 
in wages, major decisions conceming production and investment.
These participatory rights of the Works Councils are regarded as more limited than 
the earlier participatory rights of the former unions, namely the rights of the shop 
stewards’ bodies in the 1970s and 1980s. In the early 1990s there was a fear that such 
rights would interfere with ‘free bargaining’ and would conflict with the rights of the 
emerging priváté owners and employers.
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T h e  r ig h ts— in c lu d in g  co -d ec isio n s , c o n su lta tio n s  an d  in fo rm a tio n — o f  the  B o d y  o f  S hop 
S tew ard s in  rea lity  w ere  eq u a l to  the  strong  in s titu tio n  o f  w o rk e rs ' p a rtic ip a tio n  in W est 
E u ro p ean  C o u n tries  (i.e . G erm án  W o rk s C o u n c ils ). In  th is  p e rsp ec tiv e , th e  rig h ts  o f  shop 
stew ard s co u ld  hav e  been  tran sfe rred  to  r ig h ts  o f  th e  n ew  W o rk s  C o u n c ils  w ith o u t crea ting  
se rious p ro b lem s fó r the  em erg in g  m ark é t eco n o m y  an d  p riv á té  em plo y ers . B ú t the  new  
lab o u r re g u lá d o n  d id  cu rta il c o n s id e rab le  the  p a rtic ip a tio n  r ig h ts  o f  trad e  u n io n s— an d  in 
g en e rá l the  rig h ts  o f  trad e  u n io n s— an d  th e  B o d y  o f  S ho p  S tew ard s w as rep laced  by  the 
in stitu tio n  o f  lim ite d  p a rtic ip a tio n — in  the  fram ew o rk  o f  th e  W o rk s C o u n c il— o f  the 
e m p lo y ees . (H ethy , 1995a, pp . 4 -5 )
Evén the initial intentions of legislators to separate the representative functions of 
trade unions from direct employee participation (similarly to the Germán model) were 
nőt completely successful. Owing to the several tests of legitimacy and to the 
obligation to redistribute former union assets according to the results of the Works 
Council elections, trade unions were forced to ‘occupy’ these institutions. We do nőt 
yet have enough experience to judge how well delegates in the Works Council can 
separate their participation from the bargaining activity of their unions.
Participation as a characteristic feature o f Hungárián labour relations
The various components and institutions of the Hungárián labour relations system 
have developed unevenly over the pást decades. Nőne of the three areas—creation of 
national-level tripartite or bipartite negotiations, institutionalisation of collective 
bargaining, and labour disputes—were tolerated in the logic of the monolithic 
political system that lasted until the end of the 1980s. While there always existed the 
need to create social consent at workplace level that favoured the development of 
various forms of employees’ participation in Hungary, the motives were very 
different, ranging from management’s interest in cooperation with ránk and file 
people, the adaptation and spread of new managerial techniques, to the ideologically 
motivated aims of workplace humanisation with special emphasis on identification 
with the firm, or to the politically motivated attempts to introduce so-called self- 
management schemes to counterbalance the growing managerial power. (These 
last-mentioned intentions were especially visible in the 1980s, designed to keep 
political control over the emerging technocrats, local or branch level union bureaucra- 
cies often in coalition with managers of the firms, who succeeded in influencing the 
redistribution processes in directions contrary to the efforts of the national political 
actors.) The concepts to implement these counterbalancing solutions and the life-span 
of the different participation schemes were objects of interplay between different 
social forces on firm and national level.
Both forms of employee participation, direct and representative (indirect), were 
widespread in Hungárián practice. The most important direct forms were in experi- 
ments with autonomous working units, group-level decisions on wage distribution, 
group-based cost-reduction centres, internál subcontracting systems, and especially in 
the widespread and highly publicised economic working associations (VGMK) of the 
1980s. The growing role of union representation, expressed in the different shop 
steward and firm-level union committee rights since the middle of the 1970s, together 
with the creation of the Enterprise Councils as self-goveming bodies in the second
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half of the 1980s, was the most significant development of indirect participation. The 
unions, having gradually obtained their participating and bargaining rights, were 
anxious when they saw other direct forms of employee participation and non-union 
representation being initiated. They were afraid of losing their newly acquired 
functions (of the 1970s) in employee representation, which was a well known 
phenomenon of the labour relations systems in the industrialised countries. In 
Hungary their position was more troublesome as they were still in a politically 
dependent position till 1989 and they felt threatened more by non-union controlled 
representation and direct participatory forms or new managerial techniques to create 
direct communication with employees.
Research shows that in Hungary employee participation has been a key element of 
labour relations since the 1970s. In its different forms, it partially replaced the 
autonomous institution of collective bargaining and labour disputes and, together with 
informál mechanisms of interest conciliation, contributed to the stability and 
flexibility of the labour process and created a lasting practice of cooperation between 
the partners at firm level (Ishikawa, 1992). The tight labour markét situation and 
organisational problems generated by the shortage economy strengthened the informál 
power of certain working groups playing a key role in solving them. The enlarged 
possibilities of participation at firm level since the 1970s helped certain employee 
groups to accumulate important social skills in evaluating and manipulating social and 
organisational situations, in negotiating with different social partners and in elaborat- 
ing overall views of the enterprises and their environment. The same experience 
called attention to the limits of participation and showed which missing elements of 
the labour relations system hindered the wider and more efficient use of firm-level 
participatory schemes.
Since 1988-89 the innovations of the renewed autonomous labour relations system 
became especially important in the situation of sweeping changes in the Hungárián 
economy, when property relations went through a comprehensive transformation, 
public firms were privatised and a new priváté sector developed, decentralisation of 
former large organisations was carried out, and a deep economic recession damaged 
almost all spheres of the economy. In the circumstances of these unstable economic 
conditions and the huge social costs of transformation paid by large groups, the new 
elements of labour relations helped to maintain stability and sometimes even to 
resolve critical situations of unrest.
At first glancé, after the transformation, participation on the firm level seemed to 
lose its importance. Somé observers expected (and still expect) the importance of 
firm-level negotiations and bargaining (in formai or informál ways) to diminish under 
the pressure of the new phenomenon of high unemployment. Others expect that 
priváté property and capitalist management will ‘import’ the well known managerial 
methods and techniques of firm-level negotiations fór ‘manufacturing consent’ (Poór, 
1994).
Apart from these assumptions—which we shall attempt to refute later—the piacé 
of participation in the Hungárián labour relations system has certainly changed. First 
of all, it has lost its political and ideological significance— local employer-employee 
conflicts can hardly be transposed intő basic social contradictions. Its functions 
connected to firm-level issues became more circumscribed. Meanwhile the social and
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political positions of the partners were altered at firm level by the appearance of direct 
priváté property, the definite disappearance of the ‘mythologies’ of work and the 
‘eláss approach’, the declining production because of the deepening recession, and the 
new institutions and legal possibilities to influence decisions or protest at firm level. 
It would, however, over-simplify the situation to conclude that new rights were 
acquired by employees in a historical period when they lost their reál bargaining 
strength under the pressure of the labour markét and the recession.
Employee groups in a strong position within firms can still be found, despite 
dismissals and unemployment. Even with increased unemployment, productivity 
declined until 1993, demonstrating the survival of low work requirements. The high 
social costs of transformation and the lowering of living standards have been tolerated 
without major political unrest and the strike rate has been low in the pást few years. 
Somé strikes have been desperate revolts against ‘non-cooperative’ management of 
workers in marginal sectors and positions, while others have been mounted by 
powerful employee groups in order to improve their pay and working conditions.
A view widely accepted among labour relations experts is that, in periods of 
recession, when unemployment increases, the number of strikes diminishes. This is 
taken to be a sign of the weak bargaining positions of employees and their unions. 
In this respect, Hungary seems to be no exception. While in the 1980s there were 
widespread fears among Hungárián (and other Central and East European) political 
and social scientists that a fali in living standards accompanied by a retreat from full 
employment would lead to social unrest, this has nőt been the case in these first years 
of the transformation. Unemployment, never known after World War II, rose to a rate 
of 14-15% in 1993 and then diminished slightly to the present 12-13%. The number 
of strikes and their participants, despite a considerable increase in 1995, have 
remained low in Hungary, thereby testifying to the validity of the above ‘rule’ on the 
lower level of open and manifest conflict attributable to the weakened bargaining 
positions of workers still in employment. In Hungary, where the majority of the 
jobless are long-term unemployed and hundreds of thousands are in casual employ­
ment, those who managed to keep their jobs in the first waves of lay-offs and 
workplace closures are considered necessary fór the stabilisation and possible 
recovery of their firms.
In several case studies (Makó & Simonyi, 1995) one can find very different 
experiences conceming direct participation and informál bargaining of employees, 
according to the various organisational and managerial settings. In a large Steel plánt, 
fór example, where collective bargaining was less successful fór the employees, they 
withdrew from participation in problem solving and quality control. Bút in the 
declining textile sector we found a case where workers who were engaged in very 
conflictual strikes in the same period regularly participated in solving the technologi- 
cal and organisational difficulties of their plánt. Participation may express deep and 
long-term interests of the employees in the survival of their firms even in times of 
labour disputes, bút it may nőt replace successful collective bargaining. In Hungárián 
labour relations practice the institution of participation used to be and seems to remain 
a possibility fór the social partners to express their intentions, to communicate, to 
revise and prepare collective bargaining or to prevent collective disputes. It used to 
and continues to offer a certain flexibility to the system of labour relations.
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As a new element of the transformed Hungárián labour relations we have already 
mentioned the W ork’s Councils as institutions representing all employees of a 
workplace. Their predecessors have appeared in several different revolutionary 
periods in Hungary, in 1918-19, between 1945 and 1948, in 1956, as institutions to 
ensure workers’ control while management’s influence has been weakened. Despite 
obvious differences in social, economic and historical circumstances there are several 
common institutional features in their reappearance and functioning:
(1) Workers’ councils were created in revolutionary situations when traditional 
institutions of political democracy were paralysed and radical changes in property 
relations created a vacuum and instability in management.
(2) This form of workers’ self management aimed to integrate the contradictory roles 
of employers and employees. It sought to defend the interest of employees (like 
any classical union) and take over management’s responsibility too in organising 
production. In 1919 fór example, workers’ councils had to deal with keeping 
labour discipline, defending the socialised form of property and controlling 
production.
(3) These councils never limited their activities to the firm level, bút sought to 
establish ties both horizontally and vertically, with the ambition of gaining 
political control over the country’s economy—partly because of their political 
ambitions bút alsó to stabilisé new political, social and managerial institutions 
(Varga, 1990; Szalai, 1995).
The present Works Councils were nőt created with these ambitious aims. Besides 
participation in interest representation and bargaining through the unions, the present 
form of Works Council can be regarded as an institution fór employee participation. 
Their mandatory system has certain similarities to countries (like Germany or Austria) 
with a so-called dual system of labour relations. Works Councils are expected to 
develop social norms and rules of the game fór long-term conflict resolution among 
the social partners at firm level. The outcome of these rules might foster or enhance 
cooperation between employers and employees and among their different groups.
Mention should finally be made of a new emerging element of employee partici­
pation as a social product of spreading innovative managerial techniques in the field 
of humán resource management (HRM). In the vacuum of labour relations immedi- 
ately after the political transformation the need fór everyday communication and 
problem solving placed a particular value on direct relations between managerial and 
employees’ groups. Beside that, the transfer of Western managerial skills and systems 
is one of the most visible and urgent challenges fór the Hungárián economic elite 
owing to the growing influence of Western and multinational firms. Spreading forms 
of teamwork, ie a n ’ and ‘flatter’ organisations with reduced numbers of hierarchical 
levels, establishing more ‘heterarchic relations’ within organisations, reorganisation of 
firms’ newspapers and bulletins, and group discussions are all on the list of new 
managerial initiatives.
Privatisation, production decentralisation, the crisis of the redistribution mecha- 
nisms, the narrowing possibilities of ‘concession policy’, the pluralisation of em­
ployee and employer organisations separately and together constitute the challenge fór 
labour relations. Nőt by chance have the social partners been urging a ‘social pact’
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since 1990. The aborted attempt in 1995— in our interpretation— is revealing as to the 
present state of labour relations: on the national level the political framework of 
labour relations and the position of the main actors seem to be stabilised, while on 
the firm level labour relations are shaped by forces following different rationalities of 
their own very diversified product, Capital and labour markets as well as the different 
cultural pattems of their everyday actions. These two tendencies of the mid-1990s 
made the pact unnecessary and superfluous.
Apart from the outcome of this attempt to create the social pact, from time to time 
one can witness at national level the need to stabilisé social relations through 
centralised agreements. Bút at firm level, despite the relatively high unemployment 
rate and economic recession, high quality performance, problem solving and adaptiv- 
ity cannot be obtained only through Central agreements. Cooperation between employ­
ers and different employee groups is based on economically motivated collaboration 
and nőt on institutionalised and/or ideologically motivated social obligations. That 
leads, even without public intervention, to ‘micro-cooperativism’ (Streeck, 1988) 
constituted by the rational self-interest of the social partners conceming employment, 
wages, qualifications and working conditions. When, on the managerial side, quality, 
adaptivity and problem solving, and on the other side employee interests related to 
working conditions and prospects are achieved, these results may distinguish cooper- 
ativism from passivity attributable to weak bargaining positions. This tendency, 
described in the highly developed countries in the pást decade, can be identified in 
somé dynamic spheres of the Hungárián economy as well. Thus, within the system of 
labour relations very heterogeneous firm-level configurations as a consequence of the 
multiform presence of participation are acquiring decisive importance. The unified 
central pattems of labour relations are important in setting a stabilised political 
background and norms fór the relationship of the social partners, bút their role in 
orienting firm-level labour relations should nőt be overestimated.
Summary
At the present state of developments we would refrain from classifying the Hungárián 
system with any of the existing labour relations models (like corporative or antagon- 
istic, centralised or decentralised, Northern or Southern, European versus Asian, etc.) 
Bút we would like to take over a few categories from the intemational literature to 
characterise the approach and the strategies of the social partners as well as the 
structure and functioning of the emerging Hungárián labour relations.
(1) With the present property and organisational structure of the economy the 
national-level tripartite negotiations gained special importance. This sort of 
centralisation of negotiations between the social partners has been based on the 
already existing, however limited, mechanisms of national-level interest concili- 
ation. The practice of national-level tripartism proved to be advantageous during 
the politically and socially conflictual period of the transformation. Bút the 
centralised character of that very visible institution of labour relations cannot be 
generalised fór the whole system. The property relations and the dimensions of 
economic organisations are far more heterogeneous, and closer analysis of labour
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relations in their everyday practice reveals diversified mechanisms and solutions 
in employment relations. The relatively low coverage rate of collective bargaining 
on branch and firm levels illustrates well the limited impact of the centralised 
negotiations, especially in work and employment-related issues.
(2) In our analysis we attributed special importance to employee participation in all 
forms, in its legal institutions, in informál ways and within the techniques of 
Humán Resource Management. With the creation of the Works Councils—even 
if they have at present limited rights— labour legislation created a dual structure 
of labour relations. Within this dual structure trade unions are actors in represent- 
ing employee interests, while employees can become partners in firm-level 
decision making in the Works Councils. Collective bargaining and collective 
actions organised by the unions are tools to ensure cooperation and to solve 
conflicts from time to time in the short run, while the various forms of employee 
participation set down the rules and pattems of lasting cooperation between the 
social partners. The Labour Code, by the creation of the Works Council, gave an 
institutional framework to this later ambition.
(3) This present period of transformation has led to rather controversial observations 
conceming employment relations. Even in a worsening situation on the labour 
markét the bargaining power of certain employee groups has increased. In spite 
of the high social costs of restructuring, the level of conflictuality remained 
relatively low. Even at a time of national-level disputes between the social 
partners on macroeconomic issues, on the firm level unions are working together 
with management to solve organisational, employment or humán consequences of 
the transformation. A longitudinal study on the identification of employees with 
unions and with management in the very competitive electronic and electrical 
industries revealed quite close levels of loyalty to both categories of actors at firm 
level, a phenomenon called ‘double loyalty’ (Makó & Novoszáth, 1996). Bút the 
national-level agreements and the firm-level cooperation between the partners do 
nőt automatically offer universal coverage fór Hungárián labour. The labour 
relations system is fragmented; unemployed people, employees in small and 
medium-size firms, the growing number of seasonal and temporary employees, 
etc., representing a very significant part (if nőt the majority) of the Hungárián 
labour force are nőt under the ‘umbrella’ of the labour relations system.
(4) The intensified intemationalisation of the Hungárián economy since the trans­
formation is leading to various consequences in the system of labour relations. 
The intemational trend of the ‘decline in the political influence and economic 
bargaining power of labour due to the mobility of Capital and fixity of labour’ 
(Flecker, 1994, p. 93) can be experienced in Hungary too, where the presence of 
multinational corporations in the manufacturing sector is extremely strong. The 
so-called greenfield manufacturing accounts fór about 15% of the Hungárián GDP 
now. To cope with the challenge of globalisation, unions eager to develop new 
and innovative approaches are in an unfavourable position compared to Capital 
utilising heterogeneous, flexible and individualised forms of employment and 
capable of high intemational mobility. The Hungárián unions are now coping 
with the consequences of restructuring ownership, of organisational and sectoral 
changes within the context of globalisation. These changes are forcing them to
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shift their attention from seeking extemal (political-ideological) legitimation to 
internál legitimation through, fór example, stronger campaigns fór the acceptance 
of EU labour standards or by recruiting members from new target groups (like 
women, part-time employees, young people, service sector employees, etc.).
Hungary, together with the other Central and East European countries, had to face 
several types of pressure to create or build up social institutions based on different 
types of social and economic regulations and developed in different historical 
contexts. After World War II the monolithic model of Soviet-type labour relations had 
to be adopted without any respect fór the useful elements of the pre-war Hungárián 
system. Following the collapse of the socialist-type political and economic régimé and 
the creation of new institutions in the field of labour relations, many advocates of 
transformation rejected ideas of possible recombination of any old and new elements. 
At the beginning of the 1990s we saw a strong wish fór ‘institutional imitation’ even 
in this field. The importance of participation, the existence of cooperative pattems, the 
so-called ‘double loyalty’ were nőt taken intő consideration and were classified as 
informál elements of a former, nőt yet autonomous labour relations system. Behind 
pure theories the everyday practice of labour relations is however more ‘opportunis- 
tic’ in following those pattems that pro ved to be successful fór the interests of the 
social partners, leading thus to interesting combinations of ‘old’ and ‘new’ actors and 
institutions, new legal regulations and traditions. The outcome of interest conciliation 
in the long run can definitely legitimate the new actors and institutions of labour 
relations at national level as well as at the workplace.
Institute fó r  Social Conflict Research, Budapest 
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Appendix
TABLE A. 1
N u m b e r  o f  B u s in e ss  O r g a n is a t io n s  w it h  L e g a l  S t a t u s  a n d  t h e ir  S iz e  S t r u c t u r e
Less than 
11 employees
11-20
employees
21-50
employees
51-300
employees
More than 
300 employees Totál
1991 _ 36 809 6 169 5 372 2 396 50 746
1992 — 5 2  825 6 970 5 773 1 937 67 505
1993 39 772 28 447 7 637 6 055 1 624 83 535
1994 57 752 25 784 8 041 6 127 1 340 99 044
1991 _ 7 2 . 5 % 12.1% 10.6% 4 . 7 % 100.0%
1992 — 7 8 . 3 % 10.2% 8.6% 2 . 9 % 100.0%
1993 4 7 . 6 % 3 4 . 1 % 9 . 2 % 7 . 2 % 1.9% 100.0%
1993 5 8 . 3 % 2 6 . 0 % 8.1% 6 . 2 % 1.4% 100.0%
Source: Laky (1995), p. 90.
TABLE A.2
R e l a t í v e  S t r e n g t h  o f  H u n g á r i á n  T r a d e  U n i o n  M o v e m e n t  ( R e s u l t s  o f  U n i o n  E l e c t i o n s  o n  21 M a  y  1993)
Percentage o f  votes on Percentage o f  votes on
self-management body self-management body
fó r  health insurance fó r  pension insurance
W orker’s Council 12.8% 10.91%
Bloc of Intellectual Unions 6 . 7 9 % 6. 1 8 %
National Confederation of Christian Unions 8 . 1 4 % 7. 3 4 %
National Confederation o f Hungárián Unions 4 5 . 2 2 % 5 0 . 1 0 %
Autonomous Unions 5 . 2 7 % 4 . 8 0 %
Democratic League of Hungárián Unions 13.13% 10.07%
Cooperating Forums of the Unions 8. 3 9 % 10.59%
TABLE A.3
R e s u l t s  o f  W o r k s  C o u n c i l  E l e c t i o n s ,  1993-1995
Works Council Works Council
elections May 1993 elections May 1995
ÁSOK (Autonomous Trade Unions’ Confederation) 18.07% 2 0 . 3 7 %
ÉSZT (Intellectual W orkers’ Trade Union Association) 0 . 6 6 % 0 . 8 0 %
Liga (Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions;l 5.6 6 % 6.4 0 %
MOSZ (National Alliance of W orkers Councils) 2.2 0 % 2 . 4 7 %
MSZOSZ (National Association of the Hungárián
Trade Unions) 7 1 . 6 7 % 6 6 . 5 6 %
SZÉF (Trade Unions’ Cooperation Fórum) 0. 0 2 % 0 . 0 7 %
Others (independent candidates) 1.22% 3. 3 6 %
Source: MSZOSZ documents.
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TABLE A.5
A t t it u d e s  o f  F o r e ig n  E m p l o y e r s  T o w a r d  T r a d e  U n io n s
Name o f  company
Nationality o f  
foreign owner
Number in the 
workforce
Positive attitűdé
Ganz Ansaldó Italian 1 500
Elektrolux-Lehel Swedish 2 500
Ganz Mérőgyár Ltd French 600-700
ABB Láng Swiss 600
Packard Elektrik Germán 600
Láng Gépgyártó Ltd Germán 200-300
Negative attitűdé
GB Ganz Tüzeléstechnikai Ltd Italian 50
Comasec Respirator French 170
Knorr Bremse Germán 250
General Motors Hungary US 500
Magyar Suzuki Co. Japanese 500
Célba Ltd Austrian 100
Orosházi Mezőgép US 600-700
Indifferent
Siemens-Terta Ltd Austrian 700
Schmidt und Bender MOM Germán 200-300
Hungary Optikai Ltd
Magnetek Hungary US 150-200
Villamosgépgyár Ltd
Kromberg és Schubert Austrian 100
BRG ELSA Ltd Dutch 100
Note: The share of the foreign ownership in each case is dominant. 
Source: Vasas Trade Union Federation, January 1994.
4 r
0-5 -
p l I I______ i______I______ I______ I______ I______ I______ I______ I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11
F IG U R E  A .l. I n f l u e n c e  o f  T r a d e  U n io n s  W i th in  t h e  F irm  
Note: W eighted average value calculated on five-point scale.
1 =  social welfare; 2 =  wages; 3 =  dismissal; 4 =  organisation o f working time; 5 =  working time;
6 =  closing plants; 7 =  performance standard (set up); 8 =  establishment o f a joint venture; 9 =  recruitment; 
10 =  introduction o f new technology; 11 =  elaboration o f production plans.
Source: The Japan Institute o f Labour (JIL) Survey: Hungárián Labour Relations (The Development in the 
Post-Socialist Society), 1992.
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TABLE A.6
L e v e l s  a n d  F o r m s  o f  C o l l e c t i v e  B a r g a i n i n g  ( D e c e m b e r  1994)
Levels
General economic and social 
targets (C.B. in broad sense)
Employment 
relations (C.B. in 
narrow sense)
Economy-wide (macro) National Council fór Reconcilation of Interests 
(CRI)— (plenary and committee sessions)
Sector-level Council fór Interest Reconciliation in Public Sector 
(KIÉT), Fórum of Interest Reconciliation fór Civil 
Servants (KÉF)
Meso or branch-level Branch level forums of
interest reconciliation:
•  Council o f Interest 
Reconciliation in Ministry 
o f Interior
•  Council o f Interest 
Reconciliation in Ministry 
of Defence
• Council of Interest 
Reconciliation in Ministry 
o f Industry and Trade, etc.
•  Labour Relations Councils 
at county level
Firm/establishment level CRI at work places C.B. etc. firm-level
Source: Lado & Tóth (1995), p. 3.
TABLE A.7
S t a t u t o r y  M i n i m u m  W a g e  in H u n g a r y , 1988-1995
M onthly (in HUF) Hourly (in HUF)
1 January 1988 3 000 16.50
1 March 1989 3 700 20.50
1 October 1989 4 0 00 22.50
1 February 1990 4 800 26.50
1 September 1990 5 600 31.00
1 December 1990 5 800 32.00
1 April 1991 7 000 38.50
1 January 1992 8 000 44.00
1 February 1993 9 000 52.00
1 February 1994 10 500 60.50
1 February 1995 12 2 00 71.00
Source: Héthy (1995), p. 10.
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